Donna Jex v. JRA, Inc., dba Hickory Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Donna Jex v. JRA, Inc., dba Hickory Kist Deli, James
Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Janicki; Strong & Hanni; attorney for appellees.
Denton M. Hatch; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jex v. JRA, No. 20060571 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6628
DENTON M. HATCH, #1413 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork, UT 84660 
Phone (801) 794-3852 
Fax (801) 794-3859 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DONNA JEX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JRA, INC., dba HICKORY KIST 
DELI, JAMES FILLMORE and 
ANGELA FILLMORE 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20060571 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order from the Fourth Judicial Court, 
American Fork Department, June 6, 2006. 
Robert L. Janicki 
Strong & Hanni 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
Phone: (801) 532 7080 
Denton M. Hatch 
129 West 900 North Suite C 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Phone:(801)794-3852 
Fa*: (801) 794-3859 
Attorney for Hickory Kist 
Defendants/Appellees 
Attorney for Donna Jex 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents 1 
Table of Authorities 2 
Statement of Jurisdiction 3 
Statement of Issues 3 
Statement of the case 4 
A. Nature of the case, course of proceedings, and 
disposition in the trial court. 4 
B. Statement of Facts 5 
Summary of Argument 8 
Duty to Marshall the Evidence 9 
Argument 10 
I. The trial court erred in its decision that Jex could not 
recover under the first theory of business owner liability 
because the trial court misapplied Utah slip and fall law 
by requiring actual knowledge. 10 
A. Condition Created From An Unknown Source 11 
B. Condition Created By Defendant Or His Employee 17 
II. The trial court erred in determining that Jex could not 
recover under the permanent condition theory of 
slip-and-fall liability. 18 
III. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for 
the defendants because this case involves issues of material 
fact that cannot be decided in summary judgment. 22 
A. Source of Water 23 
B. Length of Time 25 
C Inherent Danger and Forseeablilty 26 
IV. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment because none of the plaintiffs facts 
were contested and because the facts prove that the 
plaintiff can recover under both theories. 27 
Conclusion 30 
Addendum 32 
Table of Authorities 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms. Inc.. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) 11, 16, 25 
Banks v. Colonial Stores. Inc.. 161 S.E.2d 366 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968) 12 
Brisham Truck and Implement Co. v. Fridal, 746 P.2d 1171 (Utah 1987) 27 
Canfield v. Albertsons. Inc.. 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993) 18, 19,21, 22,26 
DeWeese v. J.C. Penny Co.. 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956) 18 
Koery. May fair Mkts. 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) 11, 16, 25 
Lend Lease Transportation Company v. McBride. 315 S.E.2d 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) 15 
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co.. 284 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955) 11, 16,25 
Miller v. Crown Mart. Inc.. 425 P.2d 690 (Colo. 1967) 11 
Schnuuhase v. Storehouse Markets. 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996) 10, 11, 16, 24 
Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor. Inc.. 871 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994) 22, 24 
Silcox v. Skas£s Alpha Beta. Inc.. 814 P.2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 17, 22, 24 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994) 3, 4 
2 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment order from the Fourth Judicial Court, 
American Fork Department dated June 6, 2006. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2a-3(2)G"). 
Statement of Issues 
/. Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting Hickory Kist fs motion for 
summary judgment when issues of material fact existed? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Coulter & 
Smith v. Russell 1999 UT App. 55,19, 976 P.2d 1218. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at oral argument on that Motion, by filing Objection to 
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294) and by 
filing the Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299). 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Miss Jex could not 
recover under the first claim of business owner liability? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994), abrogated on other grounds bv Campbell v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, and modified on other grounds. 
State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50. 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For Summary 
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to 
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and 
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299). 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Miss Jex could not 
recover under the second claim of business owner liability? 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936 (Utah 1994). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by filing Reply Memorandum Opposing 
Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandums In Support of Motion For Summary-
Judgment For Plaintiff (R. at 241), at the hearing on that Motion, by filing Objection to 
Proposed Order Granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment (R. at 294), and 
by filing a Notice of Appeal dated June 13, 2006 (R. at 299). 
Statutory and constitutional Provisions 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions that are applicable to this case. 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case, Course Proceedings, and Disposition in the Trial Court 
This case involves the claim of Donna Jex for injuries she received when she 
slipped on the v/ood floor at Hickory ICist's store. Motions for summary judgment were 
made by both parties. The honorable Judge Derek K. Pullan entered a final order granting 
the defendants' motion on June 6, 2006. This timely appeal by the plaintiff followed. 
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B. Statement of Facts 
On January 26, 2004, there was new snow (R. at 290). James Fillmore, owner of 
Hickory Kist Meat Snacks and Deli, came in the back door of the store at about 5:00 a.m. 
(R. at 290). Mr. Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes with deep tread (R. 
at 289). At about 6:30 or 7:00, after removing the snow and spreading ice melt at the 
front part of the store, Mr. Fillmore walked through the front door of the store all the way 
to the back to start cooking (R. at 290). Before any customers arrived, including Miss Jex 
who was the first customer, Mr. Fillmore likely walked many times across the area where 
Miss Jex was injured. 
At about 5:30 a.m. Sharlene Barber, an employee of Hickory Kist, came into the 
store (R. at 290). That day Sharlene was wearing Sketchers brand athletic shoes with 
thick soles and deep tread (R. at 289). Sharlene usually turns the lights on, but cannot 
remember turning them on that day (R. at 290). At about 7:00 a.m. Sharlene put mats on 
the floor (R. at 290). Sharlene stated that prior to Jex's injury she and James Fillmore 
were the only people in the area where the injury occurred (R. at 290). While Sharlene 
testified that she knew the wood floor was slick when wet, she does not inspect for water 
in the mornings and did not check for water the morning of the injury (R. at 290). 
Further, because of her cooking duties and other responsibilities, it is unlikely that she 
would have noticed a wet spot by chance (R. at 290). 
Donna Jex came into Hickory Kist prior to 8:30 a.m. Miss Jex was the first 
customer of the day and was wearing snow boots with new, but small tread (R at 290, 
289, 202). The tread is so small that it is only visible on close inspection (R. at 202). As 
Miss Jex entered the store she noticed that the lights in the store were dim, as if some of 
the lights were not on (R. at 290). When Miss Jex reached the cash register she turned 
right to go to the back of the store to make her order (R. at 289). As she turned Miss Jex 
slipped on the wood floor due to a small puddle, about four inches in diameter (R. at 
289). As a result of the fall Miss Jex suffered a broken wrist and injured her back. 
Miss Jex's injury occurred about eight feet from the counter where employees 
assist customers (R. at 290). When an employee is standing behind the counter, the 
employee can easily see the area where the injury occurred (R. at 290). 
On the day that Donna Jex was injured Hickory Kist failed to place mats on all 
walking areas (R. at 289, 288). Mr. Fillmore decides where the floor mats will be placed 
(R. at 288). While a mat had previously been placed over the area where Miss Jex fell, 
there was no mat in this area on the day in question (R. at 288). Mr. Fillmore said he 
decided to remove the mat because it was not "keeping water off the floor." His 
reasoning was that there were two other mats before this one and they would collect the 
water. So the one over the area where Miss Jex fell was unnecessary. (R. at 182-81). 
Thus, because Mr. Fillmore chose to have the mat removed, Miss Jex stepped from a mat 
onto a wet hardwood floor and slipped and fell. 
After the injury Mr. Fillmore inspected the area where the injury took place and 
found a small amount of water on Miss Jex's boots and on the floor (R. at 289). Although 
Mr. Fillmore did not see any water on the floor prior to Miss Jex's injury, there is no 
evidence that he inspected the floor. There were no warning signs telling Miss Jex that 
the floor might be wet (R. at 289). When asked about what source the water came from 
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Mr. Fillmore stated that there were only two possible sources—his own shoes, or Miss 
Jex's (R. at 289). While there was a Pepsi salesman that came in before Miss Jex's 
accident (R. at 289), he only walked through the store once, and none of the store 
employees list him as a possible source of the water. 
It is undisputed that Hickory Kist did not have a formal policy for keeping their 
floors clean from water and debris (R. at 288). The employees were not given any 
instructions or formal training on inspecting the floor for water (R. at 288, 204). Mr. 
Fillmore does not ever remember telling the employees to inspect the floor (R. at 178). 
The written daytime checklist does not have anything on it about inspecting the floors. 
(R. at 178). Hickory Kist has a written checklist with daytime instructions, but the list 
does not include any instructions about inspecting the floor for water. Further, rather than 
mopping up at various times throughout the day, Hickory Kist only has employees mop 
the floor at the end of the day (R. at 288). 
Miss Jex's broken wrist and injured back have made it very difficult to perform 
her job as a part-time substitute teacher and to take care of everyday chores. Her income 
is limited and she depends on others for help. She is a single, elderly lady, who is sixty-
nine years old and lives alone. While she used to teach computers efficiently, she now 
has severe pain when she types. Carrying books to class and any other light lifting, 
including house work such as vacuuming and mowing, is now extremely difficult and 
painful. 
Summary of Arguments 
The trial court determined that Miss Jex could not recover under the first class of 
liability (temporary condition) because neither James Fillmore nor his employees had 
actual knowledge that the water was on the floor (R. at 284). However, this is a 
misapplication of Utah law because owners can also be found liable under the temporary 
condition theory if either the owner or his employees had constructive knowledge of the 
water. In the present case the trial court judge acknowledged the viability of constructive 
knowledge as an element of the claim, but failed to address the constructive knowledge 
of James Fillmore and his employees. This failure constituted reversible error. 
The trial court committed reversible error when it determined that Miss Jex could 
not recover under the permanent condition theory of negligence because the trial court 
failed to recognize Hickory Kist's wood flooring as an inherently dangerous condition. 
The court also failed to recognize that a slip-and-fall was foreseeable to Hickory Kist in 
light of the snowy weather conditions and the failure of Mr. Fillmore to place mats in all 
areas of customer traffic. 
In granting summary judgment the trial court erred because there are genuine 
issues of material fact that need to be decided by a jury. There are at least three genuine 
issues of material fact in this case that make summary judgment improper. The first issue 
is who was responsible for putting the water on the floor. This issue is material to Miss 
Jex's claim because if the water was created by Hickory Kist's employees, she can 
recover under the temporary condition theory without proving actual or constructive 
knowledge. The second issue is the length of time the water existed on the floor before 
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the injury. The evidence shows that the water on the floor of the defendant's store could 
have existed anywhere from one second (if it came from Miss Jex) to over an hour (if it 
came from Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore). The length of time the water existed is material to a 
claim under the temporary condition theory because it determines whether or not Hickory 
Kist should have known about the water. The third issue is whether or not the wood floor 
is an inherently dangerous and foreseeable condition that Hickory Kist did not take 
proper measures to protect customers against. This issue is material to Miss Jex's 
recovery under the permanent condition theory and should have been decided by a jury 
because it is a question of fact. 
Duty to Marshal the Evidence 
When appellants challenge findings of fact they must marshal the evidence. Utah 
R. App. Proc. 24(a)(9). However, when a trial court's findings of fact deal only with 
peripheral matters and do not go to the question of whether the plaintiff proved the 
elements of his case, the only basis for determining whether or not a motion was properly 
granted is a review of the conclusions of law. Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.. 711 
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). 
In the present case the trial judge made findings of fact. The trial judge accepted, 
and Hickory Kist did not dispute, Miss Jex's statement of undisputed facts set forth in her 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The only fact that set forth by Miss Jex that was not 
found by the trail court was Hickory Kist's failure to keep its business in a reasonably 
safe condition. In support of this requested finding, Miss Jex spent the money and time to 
file get an affidavit of a certified safety professional who opined that defendant did not 
reasonably protect customers from foreseeable danger (R at 163). Hickory Kist filed no 
counter affidavit and did not request additional time to do so. Either Zurich Insurance 
(Hickory Kist's insurer) didn't want to pay for an expert, could not find an expert, or 
thought it didn't need an expert. In any event, Defendant relied on its own arguments and 
allegations. Because Miss Jex is not challenging any part of the trial judge's "Findings of 
Fact," and because defendant did not attempt to file an affidavit from an expert stating 
that defendant did not breach the standard of care and that defendant did act reasonably to 
protect customers from foreseeable danger, the marshalling requirement does not apply in 
this case. 
Argument 
I. The trial court erred in its decision that Jex could not recover under 
temporary condition class of storeowner negligence because Hickory 
Kist had constructive knowledge of the water and because the water 
was created by the owner of Hickory Kist or one of his employees. 
The first class of recovery against a business owner for a slip-and-fall involves a 
temporary condition such as a slippery substance on a floor. Schnuphase v. Storehouse 
Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). There are two types of recovery under the first 
class of liability. Because both types of recovery have different criteria they will be 
discussed separately. The first type occurs when it is unknown who created the unsafe 
condition. The second type occurs when the unsafe condition is created by a store owner 
or one of his employees. 
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Condition Created From an Unknown Source 
For a plaintiff to recover when it is unknown how the unsafe condition was created 
the plaintiff must prove two things. First, the plaintiff must show that the store owner or 
his employees had knowledge of the unsafe condition. Id. Second, the plaintiff must show 
that the store owner or his employees had adequate time to remedy the condition. Id. 
The knowledge requirement is satisfied if the owner or his employees had either 
actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Id. Constructive knowledge 
exists if the unsafe condition existed for a long enough time that the owner or employees 
should have discovered it. Id. 
Turning to Utah case law, plaintiffs have been hindered by the lack of clear 
criteria determining constructive knowledge. See Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 284 P.2d 
477 (Utah 1955) (Plaintiff slipped and fell on water at the defendant's coffee shop. There 
was no evidence as to who spilled the water, or how long the water had been there before 
the plaintiff slipped on it); Koer v. May fair Mkts, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (Plaintiff 
slipped and fell on a grape in the defendant's store. There was no evdience put on by the 
plaintiff to show who had put the grape on the floor or how long it might have been 
there.); Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc.. 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) (Plaintiff slipped 
on cottage cheese in the defendant's store. There was no evidence offered by the plaintiff 
to show how long the cottage cheese had been there and no one had seen cottage cheese 
on the floor prior to the incident.). While it is clear from these four cases that courts will 
not find constructive knowledge from mere allegations by the plaintiff, there are no 
specific requirements set forth for proving constructive knowledge. The only clear rule 
set out so far is that the existence of an unsafe condition for two to four minutes is not 
long enough to give a business owner constructive knowledge. See Schnuphase% 918 P.2d 
at 478. 
While Utah cases have not set forth clear criteria for determining when 
constructive notice should be imputed, other jurisdictions have. Constructive knowledge 
should be imputed on a case-by-case basis. Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690, 692 
(Colo. 1967). While the length of time a condition existed is one of the most important 
factors, the following factors must also be considered: nature of the condition, its 
foreseeable consequences, the means and opportunities of discovering it, the diligence 
required to discover and correct it, and the foresight which a person of ordinary prudence 
would have exercised under similar circumstances. Id. 
In addition, other jurisdictions charge a store owner with constructive knowledge 
when an employee of the owner was in the immediate area of the dangerous condition 
and could have easily seen the substance. Banks v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 161 S.E.2d366, 
368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968). "When it is alleged that an employee is in the immediate area of 
the dangerous condition and has the means and opportunity to discover the same, it then 
becomes a question for the jury whether the defendant in the exercise of due care should 
have discovered and either warned the plaintiff or corrected the alleged hazard." Id. The 
unsafe condition does not have to exist for a specific period of time for this type of 
constructive knowledge to exist. Id. 
Utah courts must adopt similar criteria for determining when constructive 
knowledge exists because without such requirements there is an incentive for business 
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owners to ignore unsafe conditions. If the law does not change, recovery for temporary 
unsafe conditions that are created by an unknown source, becomes almost impossible 
because actual knowledge is extremely difficult to prove. Currently there are no Utah 
cases of record in which a court ruled that the plaintiff proved constructive knowledge. If 
Utah law continues to remain unclear on what constitutes constructive knowledge, 
plaintiffs will be unable to prove such knowledge and business owners will have an 
incentive to implement unsafe policies such as telling their employees not to check for 
water so that they can avoid actual knowledge. Such practices would greatly harm the 
public interest and health. The law must set reasonable requirements for proving 
constructive knowledge so that businesses maintain their premises in a reasonably safe 
manner. 
Turning to the present case, the trial court ruled that Miss Jex could not recover 
under the first theory of liability because it was uncontested that neither Hickory Kist nor 
its employees had actual knowledge of the water (R. at 284). However, the trial court 
failed to address Miss Jex's proof of constructive knowledge and in doing so misapplied 
Utah law which allows for recovery when either actual or constructive knowledge exists. 
The evidence produced in this case shows that Hickory Kist had a reasonable time 
to discover the water, and thus, constructive knowledge should be imputed. The shoes of 
Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would have easily 
become lodged in the deep grooves of their shoes and would have been tracked onto the 
wood floor when they entered the store. Further, Mr. Fillmore had been outside shoveling 
the snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling would have 
required Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times whereas Miss Jex 
walked into the store after snow removal had occurred (R. at 290). Further, the amount of 
time needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in the one second it 
took Miss Jex to step from the mat onto the wood floor. Also, with the small tread on 
Miss Jex's shoes, any traces of water and snow would almost certainly been removed 
from her shoes by the time she reached the wood floor because she walked on 
approximately twenty five feet of mats before she arrived at the counter (See R. at 289). 
On the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene walked 
through the front of the store (See R. at 290). When taken in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, the facts show that either Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore tracked in the snow that 
caused the water on the floor. Thus, the water was very likely on the floor for 1-2 hours 
before Miss Jex slipped on it. 
The length of time the water was on the floor is a very important factor in 
determining if the water should have been discovered by Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. 
However, length of time must be considered in conjunction with the other case specific 
factors as set out by Colorado's Supreme Court—first, nature of the condition; second, its 
foreseeable consequences; third, the means and opportunities of discovering it; fourth, the 
diligence required to discover and correct it; and fifth, the foresight which a person of 
ordinary prudence would have exercised under similar circumstances. 
In the present case, the five factors show that even if the water had existed for a 
shorter period than it did, the water should have been discovered and remedied by either 
Sharlene or Mr. Fillmore. First, the nature of water on a wood floor is very dangerous. 
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Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene testified they knew the floor was slippery when wet (R. at 
289). Next, the consequences of water on a wood floor are severe. The harm suffered in 
this case was a broken wrist and a back injury. Third, Hickory Kist is a small store that 
does not get a lot of traffic. The area of the store is not large and thus, it is easy to inspect 
the floor frequently. It would not be unreasonable for Hickory Kist to have a policy in 
place requiring employees to check their small floor for water and other debris every 
thirty minutes and certainly before customers come in the morning. This is especially true 
when employees with deep-treaded shoes have been traipsing around in the snow and 
then come inside before mats have been set out for them to wipe their feet on. Fourth, the 
water was in a place easily visible to Hickory Kist's employee, Sharlene. The water was 
only eight feet away from where Sharlene was performing her responsibilities. The water 
was in a plainly visible, un-obscure spot and would have taken little effort to discover. 
Also, because Hickory Kist had not opened for the day, there would have been no 
customers to obstruct Sharlene's view of the floor. Fifth, with snowy weather conditions, 
a person of ordinary prudence would have had the foresight to know that water and snow 
would be tracked in. Such a person would have put up warning signs, covered all wood 
areas where customers walk with mats, and inspected the premise before opening for the 
day. 
Constructive knowledge should also be imputed on Hickory Kist according to the 
requirements set out by the Georgia Supreme Court (an employee in the immediate 
vicinity that has the means and opportunity to see the condition.) Sharlene was the 
Hickory Kist employee in the immediate area of the water, and she had the means and 
opportunity to discover it. For about an hour Sharlene was only eight feet away from the 
water. If she had merely glanced over the floor area she would have seen the water. 
Again, Hickory Kist had not opened for the day and thus, there would have been no 
customers to obstruct Sharlene's view. In Lend Lease Transportation v. McBride Lend 
Lease's employee was almost twice as far from the dangerous condition as Sharlene. 
Lend Lease Transportation Company v. McBride* 315 S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1984). Yet the jury determined that the defendant's employee was in the immediate 
vicinity of the condition and could have easily seen the condition. Id. 
Unlike previous Utah cases, Miss Jex has provided sufficient circumstantial 
evidence showing how long the water was on the floor before she slipped on it. This case 
is distinguishable from previous Utah cases such as Koer, Lindsay, and Allen, because 
Miss Jex, unlike previous plaintiffs, provided evidence of how long the dangerous 
condition existed. Further, this case is distinguishable from Schnuphase because Miss Jex 
was the first customer in the store, and the water was on Hickory Kist's floor much 
longer than two to four minutes. 
In short, summary judgment in favor of Hickory Kist was improper because the 
trial court misapplied Utah slip-and-fall law by not considering the constructive 
knowledge of Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. Utah law on constructive knowledge is sparse 
and this Court should adopt the criteria of surrounding jurisdictions in order to promote 
safe practices among businesses. The evidence shows that Hickory Kist had constructive 
knowledge of the water because the water was present for at least an hour, was 
dangerous, could have easily been discovered, and could have easily been removed. 
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While Hickory Kist is not an insurer of its patron's safety, Hickory Kist purchased an 
insurance policy from Zurich insurance to pay for accidents like this where negligent acts 
result in injury to patrons. 
Condition Created by the Defendant or His Employee 
Generally it must be shown that the owner of a business knew, or should have 
known, of the existence of a dangerous condition in order for the business to be liable 
under the first theory of liability. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 
(UtahCt. App. 1991). However, if the condition was created by the defendant himself or 
his agents or employees, the plaintiff does not have to prove actual or constructive 
knowledge to recover. Id, 
If there is evidence showing that a defendant created the dangerous condition on 
which a plaintiff falls, summary judgment for defendant is improper because it is a 
question of fact for the jury to decide who created the dangerous condition. In Silcox v. 
Skaggs Alpha Beta Miss Silcox slipped on a puddle of water in the defendant's store. 
Silcox v. Skazes Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Near the 
accident there was a cart stocked with ice that was melting. Id. Miss Silcox produced 
evidence that the cart stacked with ice was the type of cart usually used by the 
defendant's employees and not by customers. Id at 624-25. The defendant filed for 
summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 624. However, the Court 
of Appeals reversed stating that summary judgment was improper because Miss Silcox 
had produced some evidence from which a jury could infer that the unsafe condition was 
created by an employee. Id. at 625. 
In the present case the trial court erred in determining that Miss Jex could not 
recover under the first theory of liability because it failed to apply the law set forth in the 
Silcox case. 
Because there is ample evidence to show that the water was created by Hickory 
Kist's employees, (see pg 12-13 supra) the trial court erred in determining Miss Jex 
could not recover under the first class of liability. In Silcox the only circumstantial 
evidence offered by the plaintiff was the type of cart that the melting ice had come from, 
yet this Court considered that sufficient to overcome a summary judgment motion. Miss 
Jex has much more evidence than the plaintiff in Silcox and thus, summary judgment 
should be overturned. The trial court did not address the applicable law as set forth in the 
Silcox case for when a temporary condition is created by the defendant. 
II. The trial court erred in determining that Jex could not recover under 
the permanent condition theory of slip-and-fall liability. 
When a business's method of operation creates a situation where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition, they are liable 
for injures resulting from the dangerous condition. Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc.. 841 P.2d 
1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). As long as the condition causing the injury was 
inherently dangerous and foreseeable, then the business owner is liable. Id. The type of 
flooring a store uses can be an inherently dangerous condition. DeWeese v. J.C. Penney 
Co., 297 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1956). If an inherently dangerous condition is employed the 
business must discharge their duty of reasonable care by employing safety measures that 
will protect customers from the risk of injury that the condition creates. Canfield. 841 
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P.2dat 1227. To recover under this theory a plaintiff does not have to prove notice of the 
condition because notice is presumed. Id at 1226. 
In DeWeese v. J.C. Penney the court concluded that, since the defendants knew 
their floor surfacing was slippery when wet, the only remaining question was whether the 
defendant discharged its duty to use reasonable diligence to protect its customers against 
the surfacing. DeWeese, 297 P.2d at 901. The court concluded that reasonable minds 
could find that the defendant had failed to employ proper safety measures in light of the 
weather conditions. Id. 
In Canfield v. Albertsons, Albertsons sold lettuce that did not have the wilted outer 
leaves removed. Canfield, 841 p.2d at 1225. It thus put out empty boxes for customers to 
put the wilted leaves in. Id. The court determined that these facts, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that this method of selling and displaying lettuce 
leaves was inherently dangerous. Id. at 1227. The court further concluded this method of 
operation made it foreseeable that lettuce leaves would be left on the floor and that 
customers could slip on them. Id. Given Albertsons chosen method of operation, the 
critical question was whether or not Albertsons had done what was reasonably necessary 
to protect its customers from injuries that would likely be caused by its chosen method of 
selling and displaying lettuce. Id. "Each determination of whether the protective 
measures taken were reasonable is fact sensitive.. . In any event, the factfinder must 
determine whether the storeowner's vigilance in protecting against the condition or 
hazard was commensurate with the risk created by the method of operation/' Id. The 
court decided that since Albertsons did not have mats and because the plaintiff 
challenged Albertsons' assertion that it had cleaned the area shortly before her fall, there 
was a question of fact for the jury and summary judgment was not proper. Id. 
In the present case the trial court concluded that there was no evidence that 
Hickory Kist chose a method of operation that created an inherently dangerous condition 
or that the condition was foreseeable (R. at 282). However, the trial court erred in 
making this conclusion. It is undisputed that wood flooring was used in the defendants' 
store (R. at 215). It is also undisputed that Mr. Fillmore knew the floor was slick when 
wet (R. at 289), and yet, on a snowy day, he failed to direct employees to put mats in all 
areas of customer traffic (R. at 288). Just like the defendant in DeWesse, Hickory Kist 
chose to employ a floor surfacing that was inherently dangerous when wet. 
Due to the snowy weather conditions a slip-and-fall was foreseeable. On the day 
of the accident James Fillmore and his employee Sharlene knew that it was snowing 
outside (R. at 210, 290). They had seen the snow and knew it would be tracked in. Mr. 
Fillmore had even shoveled snow off of his store's premises (R. at 290, 224). These facts, 
when taken in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the inherently dangerous 
condition (the wet wood floor) was foreseeable to Hickory Kist. Thus, the inherently 
dangerous and foreseeable elements are met. 
The essential question thus becomes whether or not Hickory Kist did what was 
reasonably necessary to protect customers from wet wood flooring. The undisputed facts 
show that Hickory Kist did not meet this requirement. Hickory Kist had no formal 
policies in place for cleaning, sweeping, and checking its floors throughout the day (R. at 
179-78). While Mr. Fillmore testified that keeping the floors clean was an important 
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issue, there were no scheduled floor checks or sweepings during the day (R. at 179-78). 
There was a daily checklist of jobs, but the checklist did not include inspecting the floors 
(R. at 178). Further, Hickory Kist did not meet its duty of reasonable care because it 
failed to place mats throughout all areas of customer traffic and also failed to inspect for 
water before opening the store to customers (See R. at 288). On the day in question, when 
it was foreseeable that snow would be tracked in, there was no mat where Miss Jex 
slipped (R. at 288), yet it was an area where customers frequently stepped and an area 
where a rug had once been placed and then removed because, in the opinion of Mr. 
Fillmore, it would not keep water off the floor. Taken in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, these facts show that Hickory Kist did not take the necessary steps to guard 
against the inherently dangerous condition (wood flooring) that it chose to employ. This 
failure is a breach of Hickory Kist's duty to keeps its premises reasonably safe. 
While it is highly unlikely that Mrs. Jex brought the water in (her shoes could not 
carry enough snow to create a four inch puddle and any snow she may have brought in 
would not have melted fast enough to create the puddle) assuming she did, Hickory Kist 
is still responsible for the injuries she sustained. When a store creates an inherently 
dangerous condition, it is responsible for conditions created by third parties. Thus, since 
Hickory Kist used wood flooring it is responsible for the slippery surface no matter who 
tracked the water in or when it was tracked in. The only relief from liability would be if 
Hickory Kist used reasonable precautions to protect customers from slipping on the wet 
wood floor; Hickory Kist failed to meet this burden. 
III. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the 
defendants because this case involves issues of material fact that 
cannot be decided in summary judgment. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only in very limited circumstances. For 
summary judgment to be appropriate the facts of a case must be undisputed and there 
must be only one conclusion that can be drawn from the facts. Can field v. Albertsons. 
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Summary judgment should be granted 
with extreme caution where the negligence of a property owner is alleged. Id. Usually 
the issue of breach of the standard of care is a question of fact that the jury must decide. 
Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, 871 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When the standard 
of care required is reasonable care under the circumstances, the standard of care cannot 
be determined as a matter of law because the reasonableness of the circumstances is a 
question of fact for the jury. Id. 
When a trial court determines that there were no genuine issues of material fact the 
reviewing court does not defer to the trial courts determination, but reviews the facts and 
inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Canfield, 841 P.2dat 1226. 
With respect to defendant's motion for summary judgment, Miss Jex was the non-moving 
party, so all facts and inferences should be resolved in her favor. 
In the present case there are at least three genuine issues of material fact that 
preclude summary judgment. First, who was the source of the water that Donna Jex 
slipped on; second, did the water exist for a long enough time that constructive notice 
should have been imputed on Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene; and third, was the wood floor a 
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foreseeable, inherently dangerous condition of which Hickory Kist failed to use 
reasonable measures to guard customers against? 
Source of Water 
If a plaintiff produces evidence, even circumstantial evidence, that an unsafe 
condition was created by a defendant or his employees then summary judgment is 
improper. Silcox v. Skages Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In 
the Silcox case Miss Silcox slipped on a puddle of water in the defendant's store. Id. at 
624. Near the accident there was a cart stocked with ice that was melting. Id. Miss Silcox 
produced evidence (in the form of a deposition) that the cart stacked with ice was the type 
of cart used by the defendant's employees and not by customers. Id at 624-25. The 
defendant filed for summary judgment and the trial court granted the motion. Id. at 624. 
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and determined that 
summary judgment was improper because Miss Silcox had produced some evidence from 
which a jury could infer that water was created by an employee. The court reasoned that 
"It is for the jury to decide, even if only as a matter of inference, whether one of 
defendants' employees created the risk of harm, or whether a phantom shopper given to 
moving merchandise about the store on a cart intended only for the use of store 
personnel, was responsible for the plaintiffs injuries." Id. at 625. 
Turning to the present case, according to Hickory Kist, there are three people that 
could have tracked in the water—Donna Jex, Sharlene, and Mr. Fillmore. While the facts 
about what each of these people did and how long they were in the area of injury prior to 
the injury is undisputed, summary judgment was improper because more than one 
conclusion can be drawn from the facts. 
Miss Jex has produced more than enough evidence from which a jury could infer 
that the water she slipped on was created by either Mr. Fillmore or Sharlene. First, the 
shoes of Mr. Fillmore and Sharlene had deep tread (See R. at 289). Snow would have 
easily become lodged in the deep grooves and would have been tracked onto the wood 
floor when they entered the store. Further, Mr. Fillmore had been outside shoveling the 
snow before he entered the front of the store (R. at 290). Shoveling would have required 
Mr. Fillmore to step in large amounts of snow numerous times; whereas, Miss Jex walked 
into the store after snow removal had occurred (See R. at 290). Next, the amount of time 
needed for snow to melt into water would not have occurred in the one second it took 
Miss Jex to step from the mat onto the wood floor. Also, with Miss Jex's small tread, any 
traces of water and snow would have likely been removed from her shoes by the time she 
reached the wood floor because the 25 feet of mats she had to walk on before she arrived 
at the counter would have wiped almost all the water off her shoes (See R. at 289). On 
the other hand, the mats were not out when Mr. Fillmore walked through the front of the 
store because Sharlene did not put them out until about 7:00 and Mr. Fillmore had come 
through at about 6:30 (R. at 290). 
The foregoing facts are evidence from which a jury could conclude that Mr. 
Fillmore or Sharlene created the water that Miss Jex slipped on. In the Silcox case the 
only fact showing that the water was created by the defendant's employee was the type of 
cart the ice was in. However, this was enough to preclude summary judgment. In the 
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present case Miss Jex produced five times the facts that Miss Silcox did. Such evidence 
precludes summary judgment and creates genuine issues of material fact that must be 
decided by a jury. 
Length of Time 
If a plaintiff produces evidence that shows how long a condition may have existed, 
the question of whether or not the defendant should have discovered and remedied the 
condition is a question of fact for the jury that precludes summary judgment. 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d 476, 478-79. 
While it is undisputed that neither Sharlene nor Mr. Fillmore knew about the water 
on the floor, there is a question of fact as to whether they should have knowft about the 
water on the floor. It is for a jury to decide, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, 
whether or not the water was there for a long enough time that some Hickory Kist 
employee should have seen and removed it. 
This case is distinguishable from previous Utah cases (such as Allen, Koer, and 
Lindsay, supra) where Utah courts determined that summary judgment was proper due to 
the lack of evidence showing how the dangerous condition was created, when it was 
created, and whether or not it should have been discovered. In the previous slip-and-fall 
cases plaintiffs have not produced any evidence to show how long a condition existed on 
the floor. It is undisputed that Miss Jex was Hickory Kist's first customer on the day of 
the accident and entered the store just prior to 8:30. The only other people who had been 
in the store were Mr. Fillmore, his employee Sharlene, and the Pepsi salesman. Further, 
Mr. Fillmore testified that the watc* either came from his or Miss Jex's shoes. As 
previously discussed the time needed for the snow to melt into a four inch puddle would 
not have taken place in the second it took Miss Jex to step from the matt to the wood 
floor. Thus, most likely the water came from Mr. Fillmore. Having come from Mr. 
Fillmore the water would have been there since approximately 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. While 
the facts are not clear cut, they preclude summary judgment because it is for a jury to 
decide which conclusion to draw from them. The foregoing evidence is enough to 
withstand a motion for summary judgment. 
Inherent Danger and Forseeability 
When a defendant chooses to employ an inherently dangerous, permanent 
condition there is a question of fact for the jury to decide whether or not the defendant 
took reasonable precautions to guard against the condition that it created. Canfield* 841 
P.2d 1224, 1227. In Canfield v. Albertsons the trial court determined as a matter of law 
that Albertson's action negated any negligence on its part. The Utah Court of Appeals 
determined that this was error because a determination of reasonableness and negligence 
should be left to the jury. Id. 
In the present case there is a question of fact as to whether or not Hickory Kist 
employed reasonable measures to protect against the inherently dangerous wood floor. It 
had been snowing for a long enough time that the defendant should have employed all of 
its safety measures. While Mr. Fillmore employed some of the store's safety measures by 
putting out non-skid mats, he failed to cover all areas of customer traffic (R. at 288). Mr. 
Fillmore had previously placed mats in the area where Miss Jex fell. However, on the 
occasion in question there were no mats to guard against the slippery nature of the wood 
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flooring (See R. at 288). This act fell below the standard of care required of Mr. Fillmore 
to keep his business reasonably safe. Additionally, Hickory Kist failed to employ 
adequate measures for cleaning and inspecting their floor. Mr. Fillmore testified that 
there were no formal procedures for checking the floor (R. at 179-78). 
In short summary judgment was improper due to at least three genuine issues of 
material fact that need to be determined by a jury: First, who tracked the water onto the 
floor; second, how long the water was on the floor; and third, whether Hickory Kist took 
reasonable precautions to guard against the inherently dangerous condition it chose to 
employ. 
IV. The trial court erred in failing to grant Miss Jex's Motion for 
Summary Judgment because the evidence she presented established a 
duty and a breach of that duty by Hickory Kist. 
Summary judgment is proper when the standard of care owed by the defendant can 
be determined as a matter of law. Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 575 
(Utah App. 1994). The circumstances of the case must simply show that reasonable 
minds can draw only one conclusion about the defendant's negligence. Id. When a 
motion for summary judgment is made an adverse party cannot rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials made in pleadings. Brigham Truck and Implement Co. v. Fridal, 
746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987). An adverse party must, by affidavits or other means, 
set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. 
In the present case Miss Jex offered the testimony of expert witness Charles 
Haines in the form of an affidavit in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. Mr. 
Haines is a certified safety professional (R. at 163). He testified that Hickory Kist and its 
owners did not exercise ordinary care to keep their premises in a reasonably safe 
condition for customers (R. at 163). Mr. Haines further testified that the operation 
methods of Hickory Kist were defective in at least five main ways. First, John Fillmore 
should have inspected the area where Miss Jex slipped before going back to cook because 
he knew that he had been spreading ice melt and could have tracked in snow (R. at 162-
61, 159). Second, because Hickory Kist and its owners knew the floor was slippery when 
wet, there should have been mats in all walking areas (R. at 162-61). Third, Hickory Kist 
employees should have been instructed to inspect the floor after each person entered the 
building on a snowy day (R. at 162-61). Fourth, Hickory Kist should have had written 
instructions and a daily check list regarding caring for their floor, especially on days with 
poor weather conditions (R. at 160-59). While the owners of Hickory Kist said that their 
employees used common sense when deciding when and how they would clean the 
floors, Mr. Haines testified that common sense is not enough (R. at 160). There must be 
specific instructions and guidelines. Fifth, when it was known that water would be 
tracked into the business Hickory Kist and its owners should have put an A-frame out and 
a sign warning that the floor was slippery when wet (R. at 160). 
There is no evidence in the record of any counter evidence filed by Hickory Kist 
to establish a standard of care different from the one ascertained by Mr. Haines. In 
Hickory Kist's Reply Memorandum In Support of Defendants' Motion For Summary 
Judgment it is not argued that Mr. Haines did not articulate the correct standard of care 
owed to Miss Jex, rather the motion argues that the defects in the standard of care were 
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not foreseeable or inherently dangerous (R. at 244). The standard of reasonable care itself 
is not contested (See R. at 244). When Miss Jex filed for summary judgment, Hickory 
Kist could no longer rely on the denials made in its answer. Hickory Kist had to produce 
evidence showing that there was a genuine issue of material fact that needed to be 
decided by a jury. However, Hickory Kist failed in this regard. Whether Hickory Kist 
chose not to seek expert testimony on the standard or care, or could not find an expert 
that would testify on their behalf, the result is the same—Hickory Kist and its owners 
failed to establish evidence showing that their conduct was reasonable. Thus, summary 
judgment should be granted in favor of Miss Jex under the permanent condition theory of 
storeowner liability because Hickory Kist has failed to counter the evidence produced by 
Miss Jex showing that its precautions were not reasonable in light of the inherently 
dangerous condition in chose to employ. 
While the trial judge found that Hickory Kist employees are told that if they see 
something on the floor to drop what they are doing and pick it up (R. at 288), this does 
not show reasonableness because Hickory Kist has no affidavit from an expert saying it is 
a reasonably safe practice under the circumstances. In light of Miss Jex's expert testifying 
that common sense is not enough and that there must be some inspection policy (R at 
160-161) there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Hickory 
Kist's actions were reasonable under the circumstances. Hickory Kist determined that the 
case was ripe for decision when it filed its Motion for Summary Judgment following 
written discovery and depositions of witnesses. If Hickory Kist needed more time to 
counter Miss Jex's motion and expert affidavit, it should have requested it under Rule 56 
(f); however, Hickory Kist chose not to. 
By presenting expert witness testimony on the standard of care required by 
Hickory Kist, Miss Jex made a prima facie showing of duty and breach. Duty was proven 
by the expert's testimony and it is undisputed that Hickory Kist did not comply with the 
standard of care as set forth by Mr. Haines. The burden then shifted to Hickory Kist to 
refute the expert testimony or prove otherwise. Because Hickory Kist and its owners did 
not counter Mr. Haines's testimony, they did not meet their burden of proof and partial 
summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Miss Jex on the issues of duty 
and breach. 
Conclusion 
Due to 1he trial court's errors in applying Utah law and awarding summary 
judgment to the defendants when there were issues of material fact, this Court should 
remand the case to the trial court. Miss Jex has provided sufficient ev:dence of 
constructive knowledge, inherent danger, and foreseeability to overcome a summary 
judgment ruling. Additionally Miss Jex should have partial summary judgment granted in 
her favor on the issues of duty and breach due to Hickory Kist's mere denials and failure 
to provide counter evidence on either issue. 
DATED this fr^ day of November, 2006 
Denton M. Hatch 
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JRA. INC. dba HICKORY KIST DELI. JAMES 
FILLMORE and ANGELA FILLMORE. 
Defendants. 
RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case Nc. 050100121 
Judge Derek P. Pullan 
This matter comes before the Court on the parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. On 
April 5, 2006, the Court heard oral argument. The Plaintiff Donna Jex was represented by Mr. Denton 
M. Hatch. The Defendants JRA, INC, dba Hickory Kist Deli, James Fillmore, and Angela Fillmore 
("Defendants*' or "Hickory Kist") were represented by Mr. Michael L. Ford. 
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After carefully considering the arguments and the law presented, the Court enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On the morning of January 26. 2004, there was new snow on the ground. James Fillmore, owner 
of Hickory Kist, arrived at work around 5:00 a.m. and entered through the back door. After 
removing snow and spreading ice melt in front of the store, he walked in the front door and 
walked to the back of the store to begin cooking. This occurred around 6:30 or 7:00 a.m. 
An employee of Hickory Kist, Sharlene Barber, entered the store around 5:30 a.m. Around 7:00 
a.m. she placed mats on the floor. 
As part of her daily routine in opening the store, Barber turns on the lights, but cannot 
specifically remember turning on the lights that morning. 
Barber believes that only she and Fillmore were in the area where the accident occurred before 
the Plaintiff. 
Barber stated that there is never water on the floor in the mornings. She did not inspect for water 
and never has inspected for water in the morning. Because of her cooking and other 
responsibilities, it is unlikely she would have noticed water on the floor by chance. 
Barber was working behind the front counter at the time of the accident. The place where the 
accident occurred is about 8 feet in front of the counter. Standing behind the counter, one can 
see the place where the accident occurred. 
Plaintiff Donna Jex came into the store prior to 8:30 a.m. and was the first customer that day. 
When Jex entered the store, the lights were dim as if some had not been turned on. 
uzso 
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Before Jex entered that morning, a Pepsi salesman had come in and walked to the back of the 
store. 
When a person comes into the front door of the store, he or she walks across about 25 feet of 
mats before he or she arrives at the cash register. With the cash register on the left, the person 
can step off the mats to go to the back of the store on the hardwood floor. 
When Jex reached the area of the cash register, she turned to the right to go to the back of the 
store. She intended to make a large order and saw no one at the front counter. As she turned, 
she slipped on the floor. 
As she was falling, Jex saw a puddle of water about 4 inches in diameter on the floor which 
caused her to fall. 
While Fillmore did not inspect the floor prior to the accident that morning, he speculated that the 
water either came from his shoes or Jex's shoes. After the accident he inspected the area and 
found a small amount of water on Jex's boots and on the floor. He opined that there was a 90% 
chance the water came from Jex's shoes. 
Jex was wearing boots with new, but small, tread. 
Fillmore was wearing Asics or Adidas athletic shoes. Barber was wearing Skechers brand shoes 
with thick soles. 
The owners of the store knew that for persons wearing hard rubber shoes, the hardwood floor 
was slippery when wet. 
There we-e no wiming signs that the floor is slippery when wet. 
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17. There were no mats in the aisle areas. Fillmore decides where to place the mats. He had 
previously placed a mat in the area where the accident occurred, but a mat was not there at the 
time of the accident. 
18. Employees were not given formal instruction or training on inspecting the floors. However, 
keeping floors clean and water free is an important issue. Employees are instructed that if there 
is something on the floor, to drop what they are doing and take care of the floor. Employees 
wipe the tables throughout the day and ensure that everything is in proper order for customers. 
19. The store floors are cleaned at night after the store is closed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
that party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court is to view all the 
facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Bowen v. Riverton Citv, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). In opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, the plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving the elements of his or her cause 
of action. "When a party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element essential to the party's 
case...there can be no genuine issue of material fact since a complete failure of proof concerning an 
essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex 
Corn v Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). 
A store owner "is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall." Merino v. 
Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 
(Utah 1996) (quoting Preston v. Lamb. 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1968). Accordingly, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has "recognized only two legal theories under which a plaintiff may recover 
against a business owner for injuries arising from a siip-and-fall accident." Id. 
The first theory involves unsafe conditions of a temporary nature. The store owner must have 
either actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition: 
The first [class] involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery 
substance on the floor and usually where it is not known how it got there. In this class of cases it 
is quite universally held that fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that liability results 
therefrom unless two conditions are met: (A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, 
either actual knowledge, or constructive knowledge because the condition had existed long 
enough that he should have discovered it; and (B) that after such knowledge, sufficient time 
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care he should have remedied it. 
Schuphase. 918P.2dat478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms. Inc.. 533 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 
1975). The second theory involves unsafe conditions of a permanent nature and is based on the store 
owner creating the hazardous condition: 
The second class of cases involves some unsafe condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the 
structure of the building, or of a stairway, etc. or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of 
use, which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or for which he is responsible. 
In such circumstances, where the defendant either created the condition, or is responsible for it," 
he is deemed to know of the condition; and no further proof of notice is necessary. 
Schuphase, 918 P.2d at 478 (quoting Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 
1975). 
Where a store owner's method of operation creates an unsafe condition, the condition must have 
been foreseeable and inherently dangerous. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479; see also, Long v. Smith Food 
Kinu Store, 531 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973) (essential element in method of operation claims is that 
condition created by defendant is of such character that defendant has or should have notice of inherently 
dangerous condition). For purposes of analysis, method of operation claims are treated as being a 
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permanent condition. Id. 
DECISION 
Temporary Condition 
Case law is clear that where an unsafe condition is temporary, the store owner must have had 
actual or constructive knowledge of the condition, and had time to remedy it. A review of the case law 
applying the temporary condition theory is instructive. 
In Lindsav v. Eccles Hotel Company, 282 P.2d 477 (Utah 1955), the plaintiff slipped in a small 
quantity of water on the floor of a coffee shop. Evidence indicated that a waitress had delivered water to 
plaintiff and her companion. However, the court found there was no evidence whether the waitress, the 
plaintiff, her companion, or other patrons spilled water, when it was spilled, or whether management 
knew of its existence. The court ruled that "[u]nder such circumstances, a jury cannot be permitted to 
speculate that the defendant was negligent." 
In Koer v. Mavfair Vlarkets, 43 1 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), the plaintiff slipped on a grape in 
defendant's store. There was no evidence to show the store knew or should have known of any 
hazardous condition, or that it had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the condition. 
In Lone v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973), the store was giving away small 
samples of pumpkin pie topped with whipped cream. Plaintiff slipped on one of the pieces of pumpkin 
pie. There was no evidence that a store employee or anyone else saw pie on floor prior to accident. 
Plaintiff argued that the manner in which the samples were distributed was inherently dangerous because 
of the likelihood that the slippery substance would be dropped on the floor. The court found that the 
defendant did not have notice that the foreign substance was on the floor for sufficient time that in due 
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care it should have been removed. The court rejected plaintiffs argument that giving away samples of 
pie was inherently dangerous. 
In Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms. Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff slipped on 
cottage cheese that was being given out as a sample. Neither the plaintiff, his wife, nor any of the store 
personnel saw cottage cheese on the floor prior to the accident. The only way to determine how it got 
there and for how long it had been on the floor was by inference and conjecture. Id. at 175. The plaintiff 
argued that the method by which the store handed out the cottage cheese made it foreseeable that 
customers would spill it on the floor. The court summarily ruled that there was i;no showing of any 
dangerous condition of a permanent nature." Id. at 177. 
In Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996), the plaintiff slipped on a scoop 
of ice cream that another customer had dropped. The plaintiff claimed the store was negligent for not 
•taking adequate precautionary measures to prevent or warn of such hazards. The court ruled that there 
was "no evidence or any basis from which a fair inference could be drawn that Storehouse Markets 
should have realized that there was ice cream on the floor or that it had the opportunity to remove it." 
Id. at 478. Plaintiff relied on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) to argue 
that the store's method of operation created a situation where it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
expectable acts of third parties would create a dangerous condition or defect. The court distinguished 
Canfield and ruled that the plaintiff had not produced evidence of foreseeability of an inherently 
dangerous condition. Id. at 479. See below. 
Finally, in Merino v. Albertsons. Inc.. 975 P.2d 467 (Utah 1999), the plaintiff slipped on a kiwi, 
and a year later slipped on a jalapeno at the same store. The court found that the case did not involve 
"an unsafe condition of a permanent, or even semi-permanent, nature....There is no testimony that the 
floor was permanently covered with fruit or vegetable debris...In short, this is a case arising from an 
unsafe condition of a temporary nature/' Id. at 468. The plaintiff failed to provide evidence that 
Albertsons knew or should have known of the presence of the kiwi or jalapeno. 
Plaintiff cannot recover under the first theory of liability. It is undisputed that no store employee 
had actual knowledge of water on the floor. Hickory Kist cleaned the floors at night after the store 
closed. Water did not collect or pool in the area of the accident that would suggest the area was 
frequently wet. Plaintiff acknowledges that she did not see water on the floor before she slipped. "Thus 
the only way to determine how it got there, or how long it had been there, is by inference and 
conjecture." Allen v. Federated Dairv Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 175 (Utah 1975). 
Permanent Condition 
Plaintiff concedes that the water on the floor of Hickory Kist was not a permanent condition, but 
contends that the store's method of operation created an inherently dangerous condition that was 
foreseeable. Method of operation is analyzed under the permanent condition theory of storeowner 
liability in slip-and-fall cases. Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479 (citing Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 
P2d at 362); Canfield v Albertsons, Inc., 841 P 2d 1224, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (the second theory 
of slip-and-fall cases or permanent condition theory governs the case). 
Plaintiff argues that De Weese v. J.C. Pennev Company. 5 Utah 2d 116, 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 
1956), and Canfield support her position. 
In De Weese. the plaintiff slipped in the entrance of defendant's store. It had been snowing for at 
least ten minutes and for up to half an hour before plaintiff entered the store. The floor was wet and 
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muddy, and there were no rubber mats or abrasives on the floor. The De Weese coyrt noted that this was 
not a temporary condition. The entrance to the store was "terrazzo surfacing'' which was '"part of the 
permanent structure of the building/' 297 P.2d at 901. "The evidence clearly showfed] that the 
defendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and that it was its custom., 
and the custom of other stores with similar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit to prevent slippenness 
during stormy weather." Id. In upholding the jury verdict, the court noted that there was sufficient 
evidence for a jury to conclude that it had been raining for a long enough period of time that defendant 
should have employed its safety measures. 
In Canfield v Albertsons, the Utah Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's grant of 
summary j udgment to defendant. Plaintiff slipped on a piece of lettuce. The heads of lettuce were being 
displayed in what is known as a "farmer's pack/' in which the lettuce arrives from the farm without the 
damaged leaves being removed. Customers often removed and discarded the leaves from the lettuce 
they intended to purchase. Albertsons knew of this problem and placed empty boxes around the display 
for customers to discard the leaves and regularly patrolled the area. The Court of Appeals found that 
Albertsons chose a method of display where third parties would remove lettuce leaves and discard them. 
"It was reasonably foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves would fall or be dropped 
on the floor by customers thereby creating a dangerous condition." Id. at 1227. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Schnuphase limited the holding and precedential weight of Canfield. 
Schnuphase held that "[cjentrai to its finding in Canfield was the court of appeals' determination that 
Albertsons had notice of the potentially hazardous condition..." 918 P.2d at 479 (emphasis added). 
Schnuphase ruled that a plaintiff must show that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable, and 
expressed concern with extending store owner liability in method of operation cases. See also, Babbitt 
v. 7-Eleven Sales Corporation dba 7-Eleven Food Stores Corporation, 2000 UT App. 50 (not for official 
publication) (plaintiff slipped on mayonnaise packet on handicap ramp outside its store). 
In the instant case there is no evidence that Hickory Kist chose a method of operation that created 
an inherently dangerous condition, and that the inherently dangerous condition was foreseeable. Unlike 
the defendant in Canfield. Hickory Kist did not have notice that it had created a potentially hazardous 
condition. 
CONCLUSION 
It is regrettable that Ms. Jex suffered injuries. However, "not ever}' accident that occurs gives 
rise to a cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands 
of accidents occur everyday for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame." 
Schnuphase, 918 P.2d at 479-80, quoting, Martin v. Safewav Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 
1977). 
Based on the foregoing, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, and the 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied. The Court requests counsel for Defendant to 
prepare an order consistent with this decision. 
DATED this 2* -day of May, 2006. 
DEREiep: PULLAN: / 
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